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The sharing of data by individuals and organizations for research, policy-making, and 
humanitarian purposes is increasingly recognized as a crucial mechanism for building a 
better society (Chretien et al 2016). However, issues such as a lack of clarity on data 
control and ownership; disagreement about how best to respect individual rights, 
consent, and privacy; limited technical understanding; and the lack of adequate 
frameworks for ethical governance pose serious challenges to ethical data exchange. 
Guidance on how to best meet these challenges is urgently needed to ensure respect of 
users’ individual rights while ethically harnessing the value of data to spur scientific 
research, public debate, and societal well-being. 
This paper focuses on fundamental ethical issues in data acquisition. In particular, it 
provides a critical overview of four general data acquisition models, determining and 
assessing the ethical problems each raises, with a particular focus on protecting people’s 
rights to privacy and autonomy, as well as issues of fairness.  
One of the central ethical difficulties facing any data acquisition procedure is balancing 
the rights of the individuals whom the data is about against the potential benefit to the 
common good that data offers. Worries about violations of privacy, possible re-
identification (even after data has been anonymised), and lack of consent rightly lead to 
worries about the over-reach of data collectors.1 Such worries, however, should not push 
us into simply abandoning the project of data collection, as doing so would cripple 
research (Gymrek et al 2013; Kaye 2012; Mascalzoni et al 2014), and limit our ability to 
diagnose, treat, and prevent problems (Costa 2014). In particular, collecting large 
amounts of medical data (i.e., any data about the health condition of an individual ) may 
be especially beneficial in preventing and containing pandemics, diagnosing rare 
conditions, conducting studies in which effect sizes are small and/or effects occur over 
long periods of time, and planning medicine production and research.  
In light of these worries, we here survey the risks and benefits of four different data 
acquisition models. The first, opt-in model (Krutzinna et al 2018), poses little threat to 
privacy and autonomy, but faces problems with generating large, representative data sets, 
as well as issues about fairness and individual benefit. In contrast, the second, 
compulsory model, is highly effective at producing a suitable data set, but clearly and 
egregiously conflicts with rights to privacy and autonomy, and raises distinct problems 
about fairness.   
We next consider the opt-out model (§3) and the market-based model, in which data is 
effectively purchased (§4). Both of these appear superior to the earlier pair, in that they 
seem to both be capable of gathering sufficient data whilst assuaging worries about 
                                                                




privacy, autonomy, and fairness. However, both give rise to more nuanced worries about 
consent and incentivization. The general upshot is that each of the possible models for 
data acquisition face important ethical challenges that ought to be taken into account 
when considering its use. 
Before proceeding, a quick note. It is clear that, when it comes to data exchange, specific 
difficulties will crop up when we consider specific combinations of data donors, types of 
data, and data collectors—for example, the particular ethical difficulties involved with a 
large internet company collecting users’ internet histories to generate targeted ads will 
be different than those emerging from a government’s collecting citizens’ medical data. 
However, in the following, we make no assumptions about what type of data is being 
exchanged, or about the individual or agency that is collecting said data. This is done to 
ensure that the objections we raise are sufficiently general so as to apply to all iterations 
of data exchange, regardless of the specifics. 
 
The first model we will consider is the pure altruistic or opt-in model (Krutzinna et al 
2018). The driving idea behind this model is that of particular individuals choosing to 
‘give’ their data (where ‘giving’ might involve expressly allowing the collection, access, 
(re)distribution, or retention of said data), without there being any direct or strict 
incentive for doing so provided by those who collect the data.2 In this way, this model is 
entirely opt-in, as would-be donors are the final arbitrators of whether their data is 
collected and used, and donation is driven entirely by something like good will or desire 
to contribute to the common good. 
Such a model governs the exchange of organs in the United States; there, individuals can, 
if they so wish, give (either pre- or post-mortem) their organs to others. However, there 
are no direct incentives—the buying and selling of organs is illegal—nor requirements to 
do so. Such an approach could be readily applied to data exchanges, with would-be data 
donors giving data acquirers their data (again, pre- or post-mortem), without being 
motivated by direct incentives or requirements.  
What the pure opt-in model does well is protect the donor’s rights: because the donor 
decides to donate their data, worries about lack of consent and, depending upon how we 
understand the privacy-consent link, privacy look assuaged.3 
                                                                
2 There is a wide variety of implementations for this model; for present purposes, we assume an idealized, 
extreme version, in which donors are perfectly aware of how their data will be used. We do so partly for ease 
of discussion, and partly because this implementation nicely embodies the problems we will shortly highlight. 
3 Of course, this radically simplifies the complex issue of how to go about securing consent, as well as how 
to understand consent in this context. For further discussion on this, see e.g. Holm & Ploug (2017) and 
Macnish (this volume). One major issue here is whether individuals get the right to consent to new uses their 
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However, the model fares badly in several other respects. In particular, because the 
collected data only comes from those who freely give it, it is unlikely that a sufficiently 
large/representative data set will be produced. Not only does this dramatically reduce the 
effectiveness of the data, making it harder to generate wide-ranging conclusions and 
filter out ‘noise’, but also brings with it problems about misrepresentation (McNeely and 
Hahm 2014); for example, if only a small sub-population chooses to donate, then the 
resulting data will be skewed. This limit can have dire ramifications for practical 
realizations based on the data, potentially even leading to the misdiagnosis or 
mistreatment of issues.  
Further, the model’s entirely opt-in structure encourages free-riding: individuals can 
readily benefit without having to donate their potentially privacy-compromising data, 
simply by piggy-backing off the altruistic acts of others. This worry is especially pressing 
it takes effort to donate data, and/or if donating data carries significant risks with it (such 
as the risk of re-identification). 
Finally, there is a problem about individual benefits. Those donors who allow their data 
to be collected and used are contributing to a public good and, arguably, they deserve 
some direct compensation for this.4 However, because it shuns incentivization, the pure 
opt-in model prevents individuals from specifically benefiting from their individual 
information capital. 
 
The second model we will consider is the compulsory model. As the name suggests, 
according to this model, ‘donation’ is not a matter of choice: an individual’s data is simply 
collected, regardless of their preference on the matter. 
While such forced donation may be dismissed as unacceptably totalitarian, it is worth 
noting that something like this model has been incorporated in democratic states where 
data collection is tightly integrated into other aspects of social life. In such systems, it is 
pragmatically impossible to be a member of society without having one’s data collected. 
Denmark’s government-run medical data system is one such case, as the collection of 
medical data is tightly bound-up with tax, election, and other social registries (Havelin et 
al. 2011; Holm and Ploug 2017), making not ‘donating’ effectively impossible. 
Because the whole population’s data is acquired, this model effectively ensures a 
sufficiently large and representative data set (at least regarding the type of data being 
                                                                
data might be put to after donation; another is whether certain uses of data should, because of the potential 
for harm, be banned even if inidivduals consent to them.  
4 Numerous desert-based views of distributive justice would endorse this claim, provided that data donation 
is the subject of positive appraisal by others (see e.g. Miller 2001; Mulligan 2018). 
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collected), which is decidedly a point in the model’s favour. But, as with the previous case, 
there are several points against it. 
The biggest problem is that the model runs roughshod over individual rights, bypassing 
concerns about consent by ignoring donor preferences. The model leaves no room for 
those who value privacy to avoid having their data gathered and analyzed.  
One might respond to this privacy worry by ensuring that the data collected is thoroughly 
anonymized. Something like this thought seems to underlie the use of Personally 
Identifiable Information in US privacy law, which, as Schwartz and Solove (2012: 1) note, 
seems to hinge upon the idea that data that lacks any Personally Identifiable Information 
poses no genuine threat to privacy. 
However, this response faces a significant practical problem, as it is often possible to re-
identify people from anonymized data sets. For example, Montjoye et al (2015: 536) 
studied three months of credit card records for 11 million users. They were able to re-
identify 90% of users using only four spatiotemporal points. Similarly, Narayanan and 
Shmatikov (2008) were able to identify users in Netflix’s anonymous database using 
information gathered from the Internet Movie Database. Finally, Sweeney (2015) was able 
to match patient names to publicly available anonymized health data.5 These studies 
show that the claim that anonymized data poses no threat to privacy is dubious at best. 
Finally, the compulsory model also faces issues regarding fairness and exploitation. If 
companies generate profits from using data in research, then they are gaining a valuable 
resource from individuals without providing any direct compensation.6 This lack of direct 
compensation is a particular problem if individuals are required to donate their data in 
order to access necessary services (e.g., medical services), as they are not in a position to 
(reasonably) refuse—they are, in a way, forced to be exploited.7 Similarly, individuals 
cannot directly benefit from their particular information capital; their information is 
simply collected, stored, and used without any kind of payment or direct, specific, 







                                                                
5 One way in which worries about re-identificaiton may be alleviated is through better methods of anonymization. 
For more on issues about re-identification, see Soria-Comas et al. (2015) and Hardy & Maurushat (2017).  
6 This is not to deny that there may be important indirect benefits to people, such as a better-functioning medical 
system. Two points are relevant here. First, the indirect benefits individuals receive may not be enough to address 
worries about fairness and exploitation. Second, it seems likely that some individuals (for instance, those suffering 
from rare conditions) will receive more indirect benefits than others—leaving concerns about fairness in place.   
7  It could be objected here the access to the necessary services itself is an important form of indirect 
compensation. Our response would be that in a just society, access to necessary services should be free of charge.  
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The two previous models represent two extremes, prioritising the fulfilment of one of the 
two goals—gathering sufficient, representative data or respecting privacy and 
autonomy—at the expense of the other. Since neither provides an ideal approach to data 
acquisition, it is clear that the task is one of finding a suitable middle ground. The two 
remaining approaches, examined in this and the next sections, are explicitly designed to 
avoid the problems facing the two extremes.  
The first middle ground alternative to the opt-in model and the compulsory model is the 
opt-out or presumed consent model. On this model, everyone is presumed to give their 
consent for their data to be collected, stored and used unless they explicitly state 
otherwise. This presumed consent is taken by some to provide sufficient ethical 
justification for this practice (Cohen 1992), and is thought to entail an implicit waving of 
any conflicting privacy or autonomy concerns.  
This approach is popular—variants of the opt-out model have been adopted in numerous 
countries as an appropriate model for organ donation, including France, Wales, and, from 
2020 onwards, the Netherlands. Further, it is easy to implement in data exchange 
contexts: for example, users of a certain phone application might receive a notification 
informing them that, unless they express an explicit preference otherwise, their data will 
be collected and used in various ways; the means for ‘opting-out’ could then be 
incorporated into one of the application’s embedded menus. 
As it allows those with concerns about privacy to prevent others from collecting, storing 
and using their data, the opt-out model has an advantage over the compulsory model. 
Similarly, because it is likely to lead to much more data being gathered, it also fairs better 
in that respect than the opt-in model; for example, a study comparing donor and 
transplant rates in 48 countries over a 13-year period found, as would be expected, that 
the rates of donation were higher in opt-out versus pure opt-in systems (Shepherd et al. 
2014). 
However, this model also faces problems. First, there are legitimate worries about how 
representative the collected data will be. It may well be that certain subgroups of the 
population disproportionally opt-out—perhaps because they are more informed about 
problems of re-identification and potential violations of privacy—leading to 
misrepresentative data sets.  
More troubling, however, is that it is not at all clear that everyone who is presumed to 
consent actually would do so (Veatch and Pitt 1995). In particular, to genuinely consent, 
it is necessary that the relevant parties be properly informed about the nature of what 
they are (implicitly) signing up for. But this condition is often not met when it comes to 
data exchange. This is in part due to the nature of data (it is hard for individuals who are 
technologically illiterate to understand data collection to the point where they can rightly 
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be said to give informed consent to their data being collected), but also because how the 
collected data will be used is constantly evolving. Since how the data will be used in the 
future is not clear even to the acquiring agent, it is not obvious how data donors can 
properly consent to said usage. Finally, the mechanisms for opting out are often complex 
or difficult to discover, effectively forcing many into ‘consenting’ due to their (literal) 
inability to say otherwise.8 
 
The second middle-ground model is the incentivization or market model. At its heart, 
this model is driven by individuals opting-in. However, unlike the pure opt-in model, the 
market model incentivizes donation. This might take the form of some kind of financial 
incentive (e.g., a straight payment, a tax-break, etc.) or some other direct socio-economic 
benefit. In exchange for their data, donors receive some kind of payment.  
One advantage the market model has over the other three models is that it can lead to 
Pareto efficiencies. Under normal conditions, we should expect that people will only 
exchange their data for the incentive if they expect to benefit from this exchange. 
Similarly, we would only expect a data collector to offer the incentive in exchange for 
data if they too expect to benefit from the exchange. This model, then, has the potential 
to make both parties in the exchange directly better off as a result. The capacity of the 
market-based system to realize Pareto efficiency gains stands in strong contrast to all of 
the other models we considered so far.  
Additionally, under the other three models, the person donating their data receives no 
direct benefit (of course, they may benefit indirectly from any potential use the data is 
put to, but there is no guarantee). The market model, on the other hand, provides direct 
and immediate benefits to the person donating the data. This feature allows those with 
few resources to benefit from one of the few important economic resources that they may 
possess: their information capital. The market model allows such individuals to take 
advantage of this otherwise untapped resource.  
The market model also has a number of more specific advantages over the alternatives: A 
recent overview of various studies investigating the use of incentives to encourage blood 
donation found that 18 out of the 19 different forms of incentives that have been used 
were effective in increasing blood donations and that the effects were larger for 
incentives that were more financially valuable (Lacetera et al., 2013). It is reasonable to 
think that we would see similar results for financial incentives for data collection, if only 
because data collection is often less burdensome than blood donation. Hence, the market 
model is more likely to generate a larger data set than the opt-in model. Further, unlike 
                                                                
8 Note that this point does not contradict the ‘pro’ argument concerning easy implementation; that it is difficult 
to opt-out does not mean that it is difficult to implement the system. 
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the compulsory model, the market model respects people’s right to autonomy, since 
people can choose not to exchange their data for the financial incentive. Moreover, this 
model fits with existing practices that are not subject to widespread ethical controversy; 
supermarket loyalty cards, for example, offer discounts or vouchers to customers in 
exchange for giving the supermarket permission to collect data about their purchasing 
behaviour. 9  Similarly, many internet services such as Google and Facebook provide 
people with a service they can use for free in exchange for the collection and use of their 
data. We can think of the offering of financial incentives to donate data as simply an 
extension of these existing uncontroversial practices.10 Additionally, on the market 
model, only those who explicitly consent to the collection and use of their data have their 
data collected. Unlike the opt-out model, the market model cannot be accused of making 
use of data concerning people who would not properly consent. 
Finally, another advantage of the market-based model over the opt-in and opt-out 
models is that it allows data collectors to target specific groups of the population with 
personalised incentives. This is useful, as it gives data collectors ways to take action if 
they suspect their data set is unrepresentative. 
For all its advantages, the market model faces several problems. It may, for starters, not 
generate more data than the opt-in model for personal data that is not so valuable. But 
even for personal data that would, in principle, be valuable enough to incentivize more 
people to donate than would do so under the opt-in model, it is difficult to design the 
market in such a way that it simultaneously protects individuals’ rights to privacy and 
autonomy and generates more data.11 Many of these disadvantages are instantiations of 
general worries that have been raised by communitarians and relational egalitarians 
about markets in goods such as human kidney, surrogacy pregnancy, and sex (Satz 2010; 
Sandel 2012). We’ll discuss three of them here.  
First, for the market model to do a significantly better job at respecting individual rights 
than the compulsory model, there would need to be maximum prices on personal data. 
Such maximums are needed in order to avoid unduly incentivizing. After all, if the prices 
for people’s data are so high that selling one’s data is hard to resist (especially for poorer 
individuals), then the market would not be respecting people’s autonomy.12 But this is a 
double-edged sword, because the capped incentive may not be high enough to get people 
to donate and thus undermine efforts to produce a large and representative data set. 
                                                                
9 Although most people are likely unaware that this is the deal they are making. 
10 One might argue that the services of these companies offer have become necessary to be part of society 
nowadays, and people can, consequently, no longer reasonably refuse data collection. If that is so, then the 
services offered by internet companies should no longer be analyzed from the perspective of the market model, 
but rather the compulsory model (section 2).     
11 For a longer discussion of these points, see Brouwer et al (ms). 
12 We suspect that this worry is especially pressing in the context of medical data. 
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Second, a market model may lead to a slightly different type of free-riding: there is 
greater incentive for poorer individuals to share their data, but none for the more wealthy. 
Consequently, if there are risks associated with donating data, the wealthy are in a 
position to avoid this risk by not donating while still potentially benefitting from the 
resulting research. Of course, the free-riding would be less problematic than in the opt-
in model, because those who donate their data would receive compensation. However, 
there would still be potential for free-riding nonetheless.  
The free-riding worry is especially pressing given a third concern: such markets may 
engender exploitation. This concern arises because it is difficult for individuals to 
establish the value of data, which may make them willing to sell their data for much less 
than it is actually worth. It may be possible to prevent such exploitation from occurring 
by heavily regulating the market—for instance by requiring companies to be transparent 
about all the uses they will put people’s data to, imposing minimum prices on data, and 
requiring them to compensate individuals again if they use data for purposes not initially 
envisioned. But this is a version of the second problem facing the opt-in model, 
suggesting that a market approach is in fact no better off in this respect. 
These three concerns combine into a fairly demanding constraint on markets in data. It 
is important to provide an incentive that is both appropriate (i.e., does not lead to undue 
incentivization) and that will generate a sufficiently large, representative data set.  
  
Let us re-assess. We began with one of the fundamental challenges for ethical data 
exchange: from the perspective of an agent interested in acquiring data, how best do we 
balance the need to produce a sufficiently large, representative data set (and all the 
actions that generating this requires) with the rights to privacy and autonomy of the 
individuals the data is about? Taking this challenge seriously, we then explored two 
extreme models, each of which maximizes one particular element: the opt-in model, 
which goes all in for privacy and autonomy, and the compulsory model, which guarantees 
a good data set. Both of these models were shown to face substantive objections, both 
ethical and practical. If we were to solve the challenge, it was likely to not be with one of 
these two extreme models. 
This result motivated exploring two more moderate approaches. The first of these was 
the opt-out model, which turns upon a notion of presumed consent. While this approach 
seemed better than both the opt-in and the compulsory models, it too faced difficulties. 
The biggest problem concerned ensuring that data donors were genuinely consenting; 
otherwise, this model in fact turns out to be just as ethically problematic as the 
compulsory model. The second was the market model, which takes the basics of the opt-
in approach, but adds direct incentives to motivate would-be data donors. Such an 
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approach has numerous advantages over the other three. However, an ethical market 
requires a cap on the incentive provided. Too low an incentive may be exploitative, and 
may also undermine the ability of the market approach to do better than the opt-in model 
when it comes to producing a large, representative data set. Meanwhile, too high leads to 
undue inducement (and hence undermines the donors’ autonomy). There does not seem 
to be any clear way to find the happy medium—the choices force a compromise, or trade-
off. The market model too faces substantive ethical objections, but it seems to be the one 
with a greater chance to strike a balance between respect for rights and gaining access to 
high-quality data. 
The general upshot is that all four of these approaches lead to distinct ethical difficulties. 
However, before concluding, we would like to briefly mention one other option: so-called 
blended models (see e.g. Poikola et al 2014). These involve blending together elements 
from various other theories and approaches—for example, one might combine the 
compulsory model for exchanges of ‘basic’ or non-sensitive data, together with an opt-in 
model for more sensitive data (e.g., medical or financial data). Blended models hold out 
the promise of delivering all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of the 
components. However, we are not very optimistic. We suspect that modified versions of 
the general objections raised above will apply to the relevant parts of these blended 
models—i.e., using the example blended model above, it will still be the case that privacy 
concerns are going unheeded with regards to ‘non-sensitive’ data; similarly, the approach 
is unlikely to generate a sufficiently large, representative pool of ‘sensitive’ data. It is 
possible that some clever combination would be able to avoid these objections. Yet no 
such model presently exists. We thus conclude that those considering the ethics of data 
acquisition must confront the implicit dilemma of data collection and engage in 
inescapable ethical trade-offs. That is, data ethicists ought to focus their efforts on how 
to comparatively weight the value of consent, privacy, or fairness against the proposed 
social benefits of data collection. The result of such comparisons may differ in specific 
cases, but cannot, as we have illustrated, be resolved in general via particular models of 
data acquisition. Although the market model seems to be the most promising framework 
to reach a satisfactory balance between conflicting goals, it is of utmost importance to 
assess each case on its own merit in order to establish how to best protect rights, what is 
an appropriate risk acceptance level, and what counts as fair compensation.  
12 
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